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Abstract 
Although there has been a substantial flow of money over the last twenty years into indexed  
funds and ETFs, the vast majority of equity investment in mutual funds is still being managed 
on a discretionary basis.  In this paper we investigate whether there exist variables that might 
be able to give an indication of future superior or inferior benchmark-adjusted active 
performance.  Our results suggest that investors should avoid investing in, or should disinvest 
from funds that: produce a bottom decile information ratio; produce top decile levels of  
turnover;  experience top decile levels of net inflows; and have top decile levels of fees.  We 
conclude our paper with a suggestion as to how this information might help investors make 
more informed fund choices. 
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Introduction 
News about flows from actively managed funds into indexed funds make frequent headlines in 
the media.  According to the ICI’s 2018 Annual Report3, at the end of 2017 of the $19.2 trillion 
invested in long-term funds 18% of this total was invested in indexed mutual funds.  A further 
17% of this total was invested in indexed ETFs.  Together then, index mutual funds and ETFs 
comprised 35% of the total.  These two investment categories accounted for just 15% of the 
total $9.5 trillion of long term funds in 2007.  These flows into indexed, or rules-based 
investment vehicles have been driven by a number of factors.  One such factor is probably the 
plethora of independent academic papers that indicate that, on average, active fund managers 
do not produce returns in excess of common benchmarks sufficient to cover their fees.  In one 
of their influential papers Fama and French (2010), who examine the performance of around 
5,000 US actively managed mutual funds, ultimately come to the unflattering and perhaps 
understated conclusion that: “In terms of net returns to investors, performance is poor” (page 
1921).  Another, related, factor must be the increasing investor’ focus on fees.  Indexed mutual 
funds and equivalent ETFs are often far cheaper than comparable actively managed funds.  
Finally, it is likely that investors have also come to the view that a much more significant 
decision for their investment portfolio is the split between broad asset classes, rather than the 
choice between one actively managed fund and another (see Brinson et al (1986) and Brinson 
et al (1991) for early expositions of this point).  The dispersion of performance among active 
managers benchmarked against the same financial market index is often relatively small; in 
sharp contrast, the dispersion in performance between, say, an 80/20 equity/bond portfolio and 
a 20/80 equity/bond portfolio is usually very substantial from one year to the next.  Given this, 
the choice between having the equity or bond proportion of one’s portfolio managed on a 
                                                 
3 See: https://www.iciglobal.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf  
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discretionary or rules basis becomes, at best, a secondary consideration where cost will play a 
significant role in the decision. 
 
Although the figures quoted above indicate that indexed and rules-based equity investing have 
become very popular, there is still a substantial proportion of equity assets managed on an 
active, discretionary basis, that is, actively managed funds still account for 65% of the total net 
assets in US long term funds.  The majority of investors and advisors therefore still appear to 
believe that active management is preferable to indexed fund management.  There could be 
many reasons for such a preference, but one plausible reason for the preference is the 
knowledge that with a typical indexed investment, even if the manager is a competent index 
tracker, the return that the investor will receive is guaranteed to underperform the chosen 
benchmark by an amount equivalent to the fees paid (a fact that explains the intense fee 
competition between indexed fund providers). 
 
In this paper we do not focus on the merits of discretionary versus non-discretionary fund 
management techniques, instead we take as our starting point the fact that many investors, 
including individual investors, their advisors and fund of fund managers that create funds for 
their investors comprising portfolios of funds, choose to invest their funds with active fund 
managers.  Given their revealed preference for seeking out manager skill, are there any ex ante 
indicators that could help these investors choose a manager with skill?  This question is the 
focus of this paper.  Using the recursive portfolio technique due originally to Hendricks et al 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) and a large sample of US-domiciled, US equity mutual funds over 
the period from 2000 to 2017, we test the usefulness of a range of indicators of future, 
benchmark-adjusted performance. 
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Our results provide some guide to the indicators that investors should search for in their attempt 
to identify a manager with skill.  One set of indicators that we use is derived from benchmark-
adjusted fund returns.  For example, we find some evidence of positive performance 
persistence, but stronger evidence of negative performance persistence, that is, the worst 
performing funds in year t, tends to be the worst performing funds in year t+1.  We also find 
that funds with a high tracking error in year t tend to produce poor benchmark-adjusted 
performance in year t+1.  However, the ranking criteria that produces one of the most consistent 
post-ranking results is a fund’s information ratio.  Funds with a high information ratio in year 
t, produce positive post-ranking benchmark-adjusted returns in year t+1, while those with a 
low information ratio in year t tend to produce negative post-ranking benchmark-adjusted 
returns.  We find the difference in the post ranking performance of those funds with high 
information ratios in year t compared with those with low information ratios to be statistically 
significant.  Finally, we find evidence to suggest that those funds whose benchmark-adjusted 
returns generate a t-statistic on the fund’s alpha in year t  which is low tends to produce lower 
benchmark-adjusted returns in year t+1 than funds that produce an alpha with a high associated 
t-statistic. 
 
We used a second set of indicators to create portfolios that could best be described as being 
based upon a fund’s characteristics.  For example, when we use a fund’s AUM at the end of 
year t as the ranking indicator we find only weak evidence to suggest that both very large and 
very small funds tend to produce negative, benchmark-adjusted performance in the following 
year.  We also find evidence of the negative impact of high net inflows in year t, on performance 
in year t+1 when we use annual net inflows as the ranking indicator.  It seems plausible that 
net inflows could distract managers from their investment strategies and, indeed, make it 
difficult to implement those strategies, depending upon their sector focus.  Our results also 
5 
 
show that high levels of turnover can be a sign of future poor benchmark-adjusted performance.  
Finally, our results also show that high fund fees are a reliable predictor of poor benchmark-
adjusted performance.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  In Section 2 we provide a review of the 
performance evaluation literature; in Sections 3 and 4 we describe the methodology and data 
used in the paper; in Section 5 we describe the results of the recursive portfolio experiments; 
and finally Section 6 provides some concluding thoughts. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
There is a very large academic literature that seeks to evaluate the performance of mutual funds.  
In an early paper Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that in equilibrium, expected abnormal 
returns – which we can think of as in excess of some valid benchmark – should be positive.  If 
these equilibrium returns were zero, then there would be no incentive to gather and process 
information about the securities issued by corporations.  However, Berk and Green (2004) 
develop a model where low barriers to entry ensure that any short-term abnormal profits, which 
might arise from either manager skill or lower production costs, are competed away.  In this 
model, knowledge of a fund manager’s past performance will not provide information about 
future performance.  An important aspect of this model is the assumption that inflows to a fund 
are subject to diminishing returns, implying a negative relationship between fund size and 
performance.  In practice these diseconomies of scale could arise from a range of factors, 
including capacity.  For example, and as an extreme example, if a manager focuses on a very 
niche sector of an equity market, such as the small cap South-East Asian tech sector, a strategy 
that works with a relatively small AUM may be impossible to implement as AUM grows given 
the size of the companies in that sector.  As managers of funds reach these constraints they may 
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need to adapt or change previously successful strategies, perhaps forcing them to purchase 
stocks that they might previously have preferred not to hold, ultimately leading to a diminution 
in performance.  In the Berk and Green model then, there will be an optimal size for each fund 
in equilibrium.  Lynch and Musto (2003) also develop a model of fund performance.  In their 
model exogenous differences in manager skill are assumed, and in contrast to the Berk and 
Green model, there are no diminishing returns as AUM grows with inflows.  In their model 
successful managers do not change their strategy, but unsuccessful managers do.  As such we 
might expect to find that positive performance persist and that poor performance does not 
(since the strategies of poor performers’ changes over time).   
 
The theoretical literature provides competing hypotheses about the performance of mutual 
funds.  The empirical literature typically focusses on equity mutual funds (though there is a 
small number that focus on the performance of fixed income mutual funds (see for example 
Blake et al (1993) for an early study, or Moneta (2015) for a more recent study)).  Although 
the empirical performance literature has developed over the years as the databases investigating 
many aspects of fund performance have become progressively richer, it can be separated into 
two, broad categories.  The first we can refer to as ex post evaluation the second we can refer 
to as ex ante evaluation4.  Both are relevant to the empirical work conducted in this paper. 
  
2.1 Ex post performance evaluation 
The ex post evaluation literature, as the phrase suggests, focuses on understanding the past 
performance of mutual funds.  The first question that needs to be addressed is the format of the 
mutual fund returns to be analysed.   
                                                 
4 Cuthbertson et al (2010) use this distinction in their thorough survey of the mutual fund performance evaluation 
literature. 
7 
 
 
2.1.1 The dependent variable 
Typically the literature examines returns in excess of a proxy for the risk free rate (Rf).  The 
difference between the two represents the unconditional, nominal premium earned from 
investing in a mutual fund.  Examining this premium is convenient for academic researchers 
since it allows them to embed the evaluation in formal asset pricing models easily, such as the 
CAPM.  However, most long-only fund managers, and almost certainly all long-only managers 
of equity funds are not evaluated or compensated for their performance in excess of a cash 
benchmark.  Instead they are typically evaluated by their employers and by their investors 
against the performance of a financial market benchmark, which can be either a financial 
market index or the average performance of a relevant peer group (though this latter approach 
to benchmarking has been largely replaced by the former, more objective approach).  Suppose, 
for example, a fund markets itself as a ‘Small Cap Value fund’, then the managers of that fund 
will be constrained in terms of the stocks that they can hold in the fund’s portfolio, as a result 
of regulatory requirements and other restrictions, including those placed on the manager by the 
fund’s sponsors and trustees (see Clarke et al (2002)).  Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) 
and Kosowski et al (2006), all produce evidence to suggest that conclusions drawn about 
manager performance can be affected significantly by the choice of comparator.  Arguably we 
should evaluate the performance of mutual funds by comparing their performance against their 
self-declared, primary benchmarks.  Indeed Clare et al (2015) argue that “style-appropriate, 
investible benchmarks not only provide a more parsimonious way of describing manager 
performance, but also better align performance evaluation with the real world performance 
targets of fund managers”.  
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According to Christopherson et al (2009) a benchmark should be a “naïve” representation of 
the set of investment opportunities that an investor (manager) can choose for their portfolio. 
The benchmark should comprise securities that are investible, so that investment in them is not 
restricted, that is, it should be based upon the market capitalisation of tradable shares 
(excluding those shares that are not freely available for purchase).  Just as importantly, the 
benchmark’s construction methodology should be clear and transparent so that its composition 
is potentially replicable.  The financial market indices produced by index providers such as 
FTSE-Russell, S&P and MSCI generally satisfy Chistopherson’s definition of an adequate 
benchmark. 
 
2.1.2 Risk adjustment 
Typically, the dependent variable in an assessment of the performance of mutual funds is the 
portfolio return in excess of the risk free rate (Rp – Rf).  This excess return will be achieved by 
a manger over time by investing in securities with risks inherently larger than those represented 
by cash rates.  Academic research nearly always focuses on comparing risk-adjusted returns. 
To do this requires the specification of model that adequately captures investment risks.  These 
models allow us to decompose the performance of a mutual fund into three components: the 
returns that the market provides for being exposed to sources of priced risk premia; the skill of 
the fund manager; and finally, luck, either good or bad.  Expression (1) presents a typical factor 
model used to evaluate fund performance.   It is referred to as the Carhart four-factor model 
(Carhart (1997)):  
 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡    (1) 
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where Rm is the excess return on a proxy for the market portfolio, SMB, HML and MOM are 
zero investment factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market value and momentum 
effects, respectively.  If we set β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 then we have the CAPM one-factor (or market) 
model, where 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 represents Jensen’s alpha (Jensen (1968)).  If, instead, we set only β4p = 0 
then the model become the Fama-French three-factor model derived from Fama and French 
(1992 and 1993).  In all three cases, 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 represents a measure of manager skill; 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 represents 
the fund’s performance derived from luck; while the factors represent the reward derived from 
passive exposure to priced sources of systematic risk. 
 
Prior to Fama and French’s papers (1992 and 1993) ex post studies of mutual fund performance 
concentrated on calculating estimates of Jensen’s alpha.  Using a sample of funds spanning the 
period from 1965 to 1984, Ippolito (1989) found evidence that these funds produced abnormal 
returns sufficient to cover fees.  However, using the same sample period and adjusting for non-
S&P500 stocks in the proxy for the market index Elton et al (1993) find no evidence of positive, 
pre-expense alphas.  Using a later sample period from 1971 to 1991, Malkiel (1995) found little 
evidence of positive and statistically significant positive alphas using gross of fee returns, and 
none when net of fee returns were used. 
 
The use of multi-factor models, usually either the Fama-French three-factor model, but also 
the four-factor model of Carhart, have often been used to risk-adjust performance.  However, 
the evidence provided in Fama and French (2010) based on the CRSP database of funds that 
invest primarily in US common stocks, for the scarcity of positive and significant ex post alpha 
using either the one, three or four factor models is fairly typical of the findings when these 
multi-factor models are used to evaluate performance.  In the paper the authors report that the 
average alphas produced by the [industry], over the period from 1984 to 2006, net of fees, are 
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generally negative and statistically significantly so.  They conclude that: “In terms of net 
returns to investors, performance is poor” (page 1921).  
 
However, some researchers believe that the use of factor models of the kind embedded in 
expression (1) is not an appropriate way to evaluate the performance of mutual funds.  This 
belief is rooted in the realisation that the SML, HML and MOM factors – that are essentially, 
zero net wealth, arbitrage portfolios – are not replicable, and therefore do not represent a 
feasible investment set for a fund manager restricted to long only investment positions.  
Furthermore, they do not form any part of the performance evaluation process undertaken by 
fund management companies when determining the remuneration of fund managers, or by most 
investors that invest in mutual funds either.  The multi-factor performance evaluation models 
are not replicable, investible benchmarks and as such their use in performance evaluation raises 
the question as to what exactly is being evaluated when they are used.  Indeed, Kothari and 
Warner (2001) and Angelidis et al (2013) both argue that factor-based performance measures 
will be unable to identify any significant abnormal performance (positive or negative) if a 
fund's objectives differ from the characteristics of the benchmark used to evaluate it.  Chan et 
al (2009) show that for various size and value styles of US equity mutual funds over the period 
1989-2001, that evaluating performance using either factor-based models or models that use 
financial market benchmarks that are consistent with the stated styles of the funds that there 
the two approaches lead one to different conclusions about the sign of the excess returns 
generated by the funds in approximately one quarter of the cases examined.  Using US equity 
mutual fund data from 1990 to 2011 Clare et al (2015) show that the average performance of 
different sets of mutual funds, using style-consistent benchmarks is economically different 
from those obtained using the standard multi-factor models by as much as 0.34% per month in 
the case of Small Cap Growth funds.  All the small cap style groups (growth, blend and value), 
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on aggregate, generate significant superior performance (net of cost) when measured against 
their respective style benchmarks.   
 
2.1.3 Skill versus luck 
Another important development in the debate about whether there is convincing evidence of 
active fund manager skill is the literature that focuses on that group of managers that may seem 
to display ex post skill.  Wermers (2003) provides evidence to suggest that a small number of 
managers may possess skill by taking “big bets”.   However, the performance of active fund 
managers will almost certainly be determined by a combination of skill and luck, unlike the 
performance of a Grand Chess Master where the outcome will almost certainly be determined 
by skill, and unlike the performance of a gambler playing the roulette wheel where the outcome 
will be determined entirely by luck.   Using a bootstrap methodology Kosowski et al (2006) 
examine the performance of fund managers in the extreme tail of the performance distribution 
to determine whether the alphas identified as being positive and significant using factors 
models described above were truly achieved through skill rather than through luck.  The authors 
find that the proportion of US equity mutual funds producing a positive and significant alpha 
in the period from 1975 to 1989 was between 30 to 40%%, however, this fell to 5% in the 
period from 1990 to 2002.  One possible explanation for the decline in the proportion of skill 
over this period is increased completion due to an expanding mutual fund sector and the 
emergence of the hedge fund sector.  Using an alternative bootstrap technique Fama and French 
(2010) find no evidence of superior, net alpha in the right hand tail of the alpha distribution of 
a large sample of US equity fund managers.  However, both Kosowski et al (2006) and Fama 
and French (2010) both find evidence of funds producing significant negative alpha, that is, 
funds that are managed by managers that display statistically significant levels of negative skill.  
Using Fama and French’s (2010) bootstrap technique but using style-consistent benchmarks to 
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determine whether any observed alpha produced by a sample of U.S. equity funds is due to 
skill or to luck, Clare et al (2015) find that different segments of the market, ranging from 
large-cap growth to small-cap value, exhibit more skill than when alphas are calculated using 
factor-based models.   Finally, using data on 842 UK equity mutual funds for the period 1972 
to 2002, Cuthbertson et al (2008) find that only 12 of the top 20 funds produced an alpha that 
could be said to be due to skill rather than to luck. 
 
2.1.4 Market timing 
As well as attempting to determine, ex post, the skill of a fund manager as measured by the 
constant (alpha) in an expression such as (1), researchers have also focused on another aspect 
of manager skill – market timing.  The focus here is the manager’s ability to increase the risk 
profile of their fund ahead of a general rise in the market, and reduce that exposure ahead of a 
general fall in the market.  By doing so successfully, other things equal, the manager will be 
able to add value to their portfolio over time.  Researchers have tended to use three approaches 
to identify timing skill.  The first two, due to Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and to Henriksson and 
Merton (1981): 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓[𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡] + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡        (2) 
 
where 𝑓𝑓[𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡] = 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 for the Treynor and Mazuy model and 𝑓𝑓[𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡] = [𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡]+ in the 
Henriksson and Merton model.  In each case the model can be estimated using OLS, where 
evidence that 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝 is positive and statistically significant is taken as evidence that the manager 
has displayed positive market timing ability.  However, the unconditional model in (2) cannot 
properly distinguish between the skill represented by 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 and 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝 which led Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) to propose a conditional version of (2) as follows: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1′ �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+12 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡+1   (3) 
 
where 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝 is a linear function of 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡, a set of publicly available information.    
 
Using both unconditional and conditional market timing models researchers have tended to 
find very little evidence of market timing abilities among fund managers when using monthly 
data.  For example, using US mutual fund data Ferson and Schadt (1996), Wermers (2000) or 
Goetzman et al (2000) find no evidence of market timing ability among US equity fund 
managers; Fletcher (1995) finds little evidence amongst UK equity fund managers; and Clare 
et al (2009) find no evidence among mangers of pooled UK equity pension fund managers.  
One explanation for the absence of market timing skill as defined by these tests is the “dilution 
effect” (see Warther (1995) and Kothari and Warner (2001)).  This effect refers to the inflows 
of investor money when markets are rising which leads to temporary increases in the cash 
holdings which in turn dilutes the returns generated by a fund that might otherwise be expected 
from a rising market.   
 
2.1.5 Other influences on performance  
Researchers have also explored the ex post relationship between fund performance and an 
increasing number of fund and fund manager characteristics.  For example, Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999a) explored the relationship between performance and MBA v non-MBA 
qualified managers finding that the former tended to favour “glamour stocks”.  Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999b) found a positive relationship between managers undergraduate SAT scores and 
risk-adjusted performance.  A number of researchers have explored the relationship between 
fund manager gender and performance.  Atkinson et al (2003) find that there is no significant 
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difference between male and female managers; while Bliss and Potter (2002) find that female 
managers of both US and international equity mutual funds tended to achieve higher raw 
returns than their male colleagues.  Other research has focussed on fund manager age or 
experience (for example, Clare (2017)), the geographical location of a fund (for example, Otten 
and Bams (2007)); the impact of the relationship between a fund’s performance and the nature 
of the “family” of funds that it belongs to (for example, Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004)); and 
the impact of fund fees (for example, Carhart 1997). 
 
2.2 Ex ante performance evaluation 
Identifying ex post fund manager skill using factor models, in general has produced results that 
indicate that true fund management skill is probably quite a rare commodity.  Other authors 
have sought to examine the performance of fund managers from an ex ante perspective.  More 
specifically, they have sought to identify whether there might be any fund-specific indicators 
or characteristics that would allow investors to pick “winning” funds.  If positive fund manager 
performance persists, in other words if a fund manager “wins” regularly, then if we could just 
identify, ex ante, the features or characteristics of a likely winning fund it might be possible to 
avoid investing with average or “losing” fund managers.  
 
2.2.1 Recursive portfolio construction techniques 
The most intuitively appealing approach to identifying characteristics that are related to future 
fund performance is the recursive portfolio methodology due originally to Hendricks et al 
(1993).  This methodology involves ranking fund managers into fractiles using performance of 
characteristic data in year t, and then calculating either the equally or value-weighted returns 
on each fractile over year t=1, and then repeating this process, using data in year t=1 to rank 
the funds again and then calculating fractile returns over t+2, etc.  This process eventually 
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produces a times series on each fractile from t+1 to t+n where the data sample period spans t 
to t+n.  Conventional performance evaluation metrics (such as the Sharpe ratio) and factor 
models can then used to evaluate the performance of the fractile portfolios, usually over the 
period t+1 to t+n.  If these fractiles produce statistically significant alphas, it implies that an 
investor employing an investment strategy that involves choosing a set of funds at the start of 
the year based on ex post criteria could lead to superior performance for that investor.  
 
2.2.2 Ranking by fund alpha  
Clearly there is potentially a very wide set of criteria that one could use to rank the performance 
of a mutual fund, the main limitation to this set is the richness of the available mutual databases.  
Most extant studies that have employed the recursive portfolio construction technique to 
evaluate mutual fund performance have used estimates of alpha as the ranking indicator, where 
these alphas have been calculated using a range of factor models.   
 
Using a recursive ranking process a sample of 188 US equity funds Elton et al (1996) find 
evidence of a positive alpha of 0.5%pa for the top decile of funds and a negative alpha of 
between -2.4% and -5.4%pa for the bottom decile of funds depending upon the rebalancing 
period used.  Brown and Goetzmann (1995) found a similar result.  Using a much larger sample 
Carhart (1997) found that the post ranking alpha of all decile portfolios was negative, and 
significantly so for the bottom three deciles.  These alphas were calculated using the Carhart 
four-factor model.  Carhart’s results suggest that the more positive results documented by Elton 
et al (1996b) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995), were due to a failure to account for momentum 
stocks that may have been prominent components of the portfolios of mutual fund “winners”.  
Teo and Woo (2001) argue that the returns on mutual funds should be style-adjusted to account 
for the differences in approach.  Using US equity mutual fund data from 1984 to 1999 and an 
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alpha calculated from an augmented four factor model to pre-rank funds they find that the top 
ranked mutual funds produced excess performance of around 3.6%.  Their research also 
highlighted that negative return persistence was more significant, statistically and 
economically, than any positive performance persistence.  Finally, as well as ranking by alpha, 
some researchers have advocated ranking by the t-ratio of the alpha since, for example, a top 
decile alpha in any year could be due to one, lucky return observation. 
   
2.2.3 Other possible ranking criteria  
Sorting mutual funds into fractiles based upon pre-ranking alphas is only one of a very wide 
range of ranking criteria that could be used to examine, ex ante, the performance of mutual 
funds.  Indeed, a whole host of these possible contenders could be derived from fund returns, 
including: cumulative return in excess of a fund-specific benchmark; standard deviation of 
return; Sharpe ratio; information ratio; factor betas; maximum or minimum monthly/daily 
returns; etc.  However, researchers have used the growing richness of mutual fund databases 
to explore the relationship between the performance of funds and a range of fund characteristics 
and information, usually from an ex post perspective.  But these relationships could provide 
potentially useful information about future fund performance.   
 
There exists a significant body of research that has looked at the relationship between fund 
returns and net flows into those funds.  This fund flow literature is related to the fund 
performance persistence literature.  If fund performance is persistent, and investors know this 
so that they are able to act on this information by switching investments continuously to higher 
performing funds, then we would expect to see positive (poor) performance to be followed by 
positive (negative) net inflows.  However, there is very strong evidence to suggest a convex 
relationship between fund flows and fund performance, with superior performance attracting 
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disproportionately large net inflows, while poor performance does not lead to commensurate 
net outflows (for example see Ippolito (1992) or Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004)).  Zheng 
(1999) finds that funds that experience high cash inflows tend to outperform funds that 
experience low cash inflows.  However, Sapp and Tiwari (2004) repeat Zheng’s experience 
and find that when they assess the post ranking performance of funds ranked by net fund flow 
with a four factor rather than the three factor model used by Zheng, that funds that experience 
positive net inflows do not significantly outperform those with lower net inflows.  Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013) estimate a multi-factor model of fund returns, and then use the R2 as predicting 
future fund performance.  They argue that lower R2 indicates great selectivity and that as such 
this metric is able to predict better future fund performance.  Their results are consistent with 
those of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) who find that their measure of active fund management 
– the divergence of the mutual fund’s holdings from the benchmark – is also a good predictor 
of future alpha. 
 
Finally, in tangentially related research Barber and Odean (2000) found that “too much trading 
can damage your wealth.” A number of researchers have explored the relationship between 
turnover and performance.  Using fund data from 1975 to 1993 and the recursive portfolio 
construction methodology Wermers (2000) did not find that prior knowledge of a fund’s 
turnover could help investors generate positive abnormal net returns.   However, both Carhart 
(1997) and Chalmers et al (1999) both found that performance was negatively related to 
turnover (and to fees). 
 
3.  Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is possible to identify variables that might act as 
indicators of either future, benchmark-adjusted positive or poor performance. 
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A number of studies have looked at the predictability of fund returns over one month, one-year 
and two-year horizons (for example see Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al (1993), 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(1996)).  Using a comprehensive database comprising over 1,800 US equity mutual funds 
spanning the period from 1963 to 1993, Carhart (1997) applies a recursive portfolio formation 
methodology, similar to the one applied in this paper.  Amongst many results, Carhart finds 
evidence of persistence based on a one year, net return ranking period and that the persistence 
identified in earlier studies may have been due to momentum effects, not accounted for in the 
one and three factor performance evaluation models, persistence that was less significant with 
the application of the Carhart four factor model. 
 
To investigate the usefulness, or otherwise, of any set of indicators we apply the recursive 
portfolio methodology.  This methodology involves the construction of portfolios of mutual 
funds formed recursively according to sets of possible indicators of future performance.  The 
value of each indicator at the end of year t is used to rank funds, and then to create equally-
weighted deciles5.  The monthly performance of these fractile portfolios is then monitored over 
year t+1.  At the end of year t+1, the indicator value at the end of year t+1 is used to re-rank 
the mutual funds.  The monthly performance of these fractile portfolios is then monitored over 
year t+2, and so on.  This process eventually produces a time series of monthly portfolio returns 
of mutual funds from year t+1 to tn, for the n years of the sample period.  To evaluate the 
performance of the portfolios we report the average, net-of-fee benchmark-adjusted returns of 
                                                 
5 In unreported research we also calculated averages of these indicators over year t-2, t-1 and t to see whether 
there was any useful longer-term information in them.  However these results, that are available on request, did 
not yield any useful, ex ante performance information.   
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each portfolio decile and the alpha and t-alpha of each portfolio decile based upon both the one 
and four factor model. 
 
4. Data Description 
4.1 Fund returns 
To establish whether it is possible to identify features of a fund’s performance that indicate that 
investors should invest in a fund or, alternatively, remove that fund from their portfolio, we 
collected data on the performance and other characteristics of a set of surviving and non-
surviving mutual funds from the Morningstar database over the period from January 2000 to 
December 2017.  The monthly return data was collected both gross and net of management 
fees.  All of these funds were US equity funds, managed on an active basis and all were 
domiciled in the USA.  Any duplicates were removed from the sample, by downloading only 
the oldest share class of each fund.  Each fund in the sample was categorised as focussing on 
Large-cap, Mid-cap or Small-cap stocks where these categories were decomposed further by 
Morningstar into Blend, Growth and Value styles.  The range of fund styles therefore meant 
that the aims of each fund and the performance of each manager could vary quite substantially.  
As one way of evaluating the performance of such a wide range of fund management objectives 
we also collected the monthly returns on a set of benchmarks.  Each fund and its stated 
benchmark were combined to create benchmark-adjusted returns.  We also calculated the 
returns on each fund in excess of cash, where we proxied the risk free cash rate as the yield on 
a 1 month US Treasury Bill.  Finally, we calculated risk-adjusted returns using the single factor 
model, where this single factor was the excess return on the S&P 500 Composite index, and 
using the four factor Carhart model.  We collected the returns for the S&P Composite index 
and the cash rate from Thomson Financials’ DataStream service and the size and book-to-
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market factors from the Professor Kenneth French’s website6.  Tables 1 and 2 contain some 
basic descriptive statistics for the performance of the funds in the database. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the performance of the full sample of funds in 
excess of the proxy for the risk free rate, in both gross and net of fee formats.  The average 
gross and net excess returns on the full sample of 2,159 funds is 0.48% and 0.38% per month, 
while the average gross and net monthly alphas is 0.27% and 0.17% respectively, where these 
were calculated using the single factor model.   The proportion of funds producing a positive 
and statistically significant alpha over this period, net of fees, is 13.4%.  This is a relatively 
high proportion compared with previous studies.  But there is a good reason for this.  It has 
long been recognised that the single factor model, with an index like the S&P500 as the factor 
proxy, should probably be enhanced with other factors, particularly when the range of funds 
focus on different styles, for example, large cap versus small cap, and value versus growth 
stocks.  
 
Table 1 also presents the performance statistics for sets of funds grouped according to their 
stated benchmark.  Of the full sample, 653 are benchmarked against the S&P500.  The 
proportion of statistically significant net alphas is 8.9%, compared to 13.4% for the full sample.   
A number of the categories have generated a very high proportion of net significant alphas.  
For example, 28.6% of the 175 funds that are benchmarked against the Russell 2000 generate 
a positive and significant net alpha.  These results show that either the funds benchmarked 
against other indices are managed by more skilful managers, or that the S&P 500 is not able to 
capture the risks embodied in these funds appropriately.   
 
                                                 
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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Table 2 presents descriptive performance statistics based upon fund returns in excess of the 
fund’s benchmark for the 2,133 of funds that had a stated benchmark in the Morningstar 
database.  The proportion of funds producing a statistically significant, gross-of-fee significant 
alpha is 17.6% - just shy of one in five.  However, once fees are accounted for this figure falls 
to 7.5% of this set of funds.  Table 2 also shows that only 3.3% of the 242 funds benchmarked 
against the Russell 1000 Growth produce positive and significant net alphas.  The sector that 
produces the most significant net alphas is benchmarked against the Russell 3000 Value index 
where 23.1% of the 26 funds demonstrate skill as defined by alpha generated from a single 
factor model.  The much lower proportions achieving positive net alphas are more in keeping 
with the results reported by other researchers using a similar set of funds (for example see Clare 
et al (2015)). 
 
The performance statistics presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that manager skill may not be 
distributed evenly across the US equity mutual fund sector.  They also confirm the results of 
others that around half of the small proportion of funds that do appear to produce a statistically 
significant alpha do not appear to do so once fees are taken into account.  This suggests that 
fund management companies are charging too high a fee for the skill of their managers.  
Furthermore, our results suggest that fund managers also struggle to produce positive and 
significant alphas, net of fees when we benchmark-adjust fund returns using the funds’ self-
declared benchmarks. 
 
4.2 The ranking indicators 
To establish whether there may be clues to the future performance of a fund based on prior 
information we need to establish a set of indicators.  These indicators will form the basis of the 
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recursive portfolio evaluation technique described above.  The following set of indicators were 
calculated from the returns data described in Table 1, these are: 
• Average Benchmark-adjusted Return (Rp-Rb) 
• Tracking Error (SD,Rp-Rb) 
• Information Ratio (Rp-Rb)/SD,(Rp-Rb)) 
• Minimum Monthly Return 
• t-alpha 
 
Using a fund’s Average Benchmark-adjusted Return as a way of ranking funds, will 
demonstrate whether there is persistence in fund returns, that is, the performance of the 
portfolios comprised of the highest benchmark-adjusted returns will tend to be high if positive 
performance persistence exists within the sample.  Conversely the subsequent performance of 
the portfolios comprised of the lowest benchmark-adjusted returns will tend to be low if 
negative performance persistence is present in the sample.  The Tracking Error indicator is 
calculated using monthly benchmark-adjusted returns over a full calendar year.  This variable 
represents a measure of the off-benchmark bets that a manager has taken over the course of a 
year.  Of course a tracking error of zero indicates that the fund has probably been run like an 
index tracking fund.  The Information Ratio indicator is the ratio of average benchmark-
adjusted returns to the fund’s Tracking Error.  This reward-to-risk ratio may tell us more about 
the future skill of the manager than either the benchmark-adjusted return or the tracking error 
since, for example, a high tracking error may be a sign of poor risk control if returns are low, 
but a sign of manager skill if achieved returns are commensurately high.  The Minimum 
Monthly Return is simply the lowest, benchmark-adjusted return that fund i generates over the 
course of a calendar year in any single month.  If a fund experiences a very large benchmark-
adjusted loss in any single month this could be a sign that the risk management of this fund is 
poor and therefore that the fund manager’s skill is also low.  Finally, we estimate the alpha of 
each fund, using a single factor model, but rather than using the alpha as the ranking indicator 
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we instead use the t-statistic of the alpha.  A high alpha may have been achieved by luck, but 
a high t-alpha may indicate that the related alpha has been achieved with some consistency and 
is therefore could be a better measure of future manager skill.   
The second set of potential performance indicators were collected from Morningstar, and 
represent characteristics of the funds in the sample.  This set comprises the following 
indicators: 
• Fund Size (AUM) 
• Annual Net Flow 
• Annual Turnover Ratio 
• Average Number of Stocks 
• Fund fees 
 
Fund Size is the AUM of fund i at the end of year t.  It is possible that the AUM of a fund may 
have some impact on its future performance, in particular managers of large funds may 
encounter capacity constraints in employing their strategies as the fund gets larger.  Annual Net 
Flow is the total net flow into fund i in year t.  A healthy net inflow of funds could, conceivably 
have either a positive impact on future performance by giving managers the liquidity to adapt 
and develop their strategies or, alternatively, high net inflows may be a distraction as managers 
seek to find new investments for the new funds, rather than focusing on the monitoring of 
existing strategies.  Annual Turnover Ratio is the annual turnover of fund i over year t as a 
proportion of AUM.  Managers that turnover their portfolios frequently will incur higher 
transactions costs and, additionally, high turnover may be a sign of a poorly focused approach 
to strategy that may change frequently.  Finally, there may be a relationship between the 
Average Numbers of Stocks held by a fund and its subsequent performance.  A fund, focussed 
on a small number of stocks may be a good indicator of manager conviction and or confidence.  
Conversely, too few stocks could lead to higher tracking error and a worse risk-adjusted 
performance in the absence of adequate diversification.  To investigate this relationship we use 
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the Average number of fund holdings as an indicator.  Finally, we rank funds by their annual 
fee, calculated by subtracting the fund’s net-of-fee return from its gross-of-fee return in year t.  
A recent Morningstar study (Morningstar (2016)) found evidence to suggest that there existed 
a negative relationship between fund fees and subsequent fund performance. 
 
5.  Results 
In this section of the paper we present the performance evaluation results using the recursive 
portfolio technique described in Section 3.  We begin by presenting the results of pre-ranking 
portfolios using indicators based upon net-of-fee fund returns in excess of stated benchmarks, 
and then report equivalent results where the decile portfolios were pre-ranked using other fund-
related data.  Studies of this kind are normally based on net-of-fee returns in excess of the risk 
free rate, but given the variation in performance from category to category reported in tables 1 
and 2 we believe that it is important to report benchmark-adjusted returns.   
 
Figures 1 to 5 present the annualised, benchmark-adjusted performance of the decile portfolios 
based upon ex post returns, while Tables 3 to 7 present the related portfolio ranking 
performance statistics.  The performance statistics for the equally-weighted portfolios of 
mutual funds are based upon the sample from January 2001 to December 2017, where the 
returns are again benchmark-adjusted.  For each table we present the annualised, benchmark-
adjusted return of the portfolios over this sample period, the annualised alphas and the t-
statistics produced by both a one factor model and the Cahart (1997) four factor model.  For 
each ranking criteria we present the performance statistics for portfolios formed into deciles 
(D1 to D10).  The size of the sample of funds used in this study meant that the average number 
of funds in each decile ranged from around 130 to 200.  Given this, we also look further in to 
the ranking tails by also forming equally-weighted portfolios of funds comprising the top and 
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bottom twenty ranked funds according to each ranking criteria (referred to in the tables as T20 
and B20 respectively).  
 
6.1 Returns-based rankings 
Figure 1 presents the annualised returns of the portfolios of mutual funds ranked by average, 
benchmark-adjusted return in year t and then monitored over year t+1, with this process 
repeated annually.  The chart shows some evidence of positive performance persistence, but 
more evidence of negative performance persistence.  Table 3 presents the related performance 
statistics of the portfolios.  Portfolio D1 produces an average, benchmark-adjusted 
outperformance of 0.32% per annum, while portfolio D10 produces an annualised 
underperformance of 1.09%pa.  These results therefore provide evidence of performance 
persistence at both at the top and bottom of the performance spectrum, as documented by others 
(see Section 3).   Further in to the tail we find that the annualised benchmark-adjusted 
performance of B20 to be -4.08%, a performance that is not quite significant at the 90% level 
having an associated p-value of 0.12. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average returns of deciles 1 to 10, ordered by ex post tracking error.  The 
figure indicates that funds with high levels of tracking error subsequently tend to underperform.   
Table 4 presents the alphas and t- alphas produced by these portfolios.  The decile portfolios 
generally produce average benchmark-adjusted returns that are close to zero, with the exception 
of Decile 1, where the annualised underperformance of those funds with high tracking error is 
-1.07%pa.  When we delve deeper into this decile we find very high underperformance for T20 
of -6.88% per annum, a result that is significant at the 95% level of confidence.  This result 
indicates clearly that investors should consider selling their holdings in any fund that produces 
a high tracking error over any year.  However, the ranking of the performance deciles indicates 
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that the average performance of those funds with the lowest tracking errors, Decile 10, also 
results in poor subsequent performance too, though not as poor as for those with the highest 
tracking errors that comprise Decile 1.  It is possible that in taking fewer off benchmark bets 
in a year (resulting in a low tracking error) that performance suffered as a result and that this 
then lead to increased risk taking in the subsequent year as a way of improving performance, 
which in turn lead to poor performance.   The alphas for all of the deciles, along with B20, are 
found not to be statistically significant.   
 
Figure 3 shows a fairly clear decline in post raking performance from portfolios T20 to B20 
when we pre-rank funds by information ratio.  We find the ordering of the performance of these 
portfolios to be significant at the 99% level of confidence, which indicates that the process may 
have some value to investors.  Generally, funds with a high information ratio subsequently tend 
to produce higher benchmark-adjusted returns.  Portfolio T20 produces an annualised 
benchmark-adjusted return of 0.59%, while portfolio D1 produced an annualised return of 
0.41%.  At the other end of the scale portfolios D8, D9, D10 and B20 all produced negative 
annualised benchmark-adjusted returns.  Table 5 shows, the alphas are not statistically different 
from zero even though they are meaningful economically at the top and bottom ends of the 
distribution of portfolio returns.   However, a test of the significance of the difference between 
the return on portfolios D1 and D10 indicates that there is a difference at almost the 90% 
confidence interval with an associated p-value of 0.13, while the same test applied to the 
differences in average, benchmark-adjusted returns for portfolios T20 and B20 indicate a 
significant difference at the 95% confidence level. 
 
It is possible that any manager that has a lax approach to the risk management of their portfolio 
might experience some occasional bad return outcomes this, in turn, may be an indicator of 
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future poor performance.  To test this hypothesis for each fund in the sample, for each year we 
calculated each fund’s worst within-month benchmark-adjusted performance.  We then used 
these “worst month” returns to rank funds, so that the top ten percent of funds with the “best 
worst” months’ performance in any year were placed in decile 1, etc.  The results are reported 
in Figure 4 and in Table 6.  On the whole the results indicate that the use of the worst month 
as a way of ranking funds is not very effective since the annualised returns are all very close to 
0.00%.  However, portfolio B20 produces a very negative annualised, benchmark-return of -
4.97%.    We find the alpha produced by B20 to be statistically significant at at least the 95% 
level of confidence when we apply both the one- and four-factor model.  This result suggests 
that a fund that produces a very bad month in year t should be avoided in year t+1. 
 
Finally, in the skill and luck literature (see for example Fama and French (2010)) skill is 
assessed using the t-statistic on alpha generated by a factor model, rather than by fund alpha.  
We estimate the alpha for each fund over each calendar year in the sample, as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡        (4) 
 
We then use the t-statistic on each fund’s alpha generated in year t to create mutual fund 
portfolios, monitoring their performance over year t+1, and rebalancing annually.  Figure 7 
shows a fairly monotonic decline in performance as we move from portfolio T20 to B20, which 
implies that funds with a high t-alpha tend subsequently produce a positive benchmark-adjusted 
return and tend to outperform those that produce a lower t-alpha.  We find the decline in post-
ranking portfolio performance to be significant at the 99% level of confidence – which again 
indicates that this approach to ranking funds may be of some value.  Table 7 presents the 
performance statistics produced by this portfolio construction exercise.  Portfolio D10 produces 
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an annualised performance of -1.12%, while portfolio B20 produce an annualised performance 
of -1.95%.  Although the alphas produced by these portfolios are not significant, and the 
difference in performance between D1 and D10 is not quite statistically significant, the 
performance difference between T20 and B20 is found to be statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence interval. 
 
5.2 Ranking by other fund characteristics 
Figures 6 to 9 and Tables 8 to 11 provide the performance of mutual fund portfolios formed 
using other criteria. 
 
Figure 6 and Table 8 report the results of constructing portfolios according to fund AUM.  The 
results show that the average performance of all of the portfolios from T10 to D6 is negative.  
This indicates that larger funds tend to underperform their benchmarks.  Portfolios D7, D8 and 
D10 produce positive though still small excess returns.  However, we do not find the alphas 
produced by any of these portfolios to be statistically significant, indeed, few of the alphas are 
even economically significant.  Intriguingly, although the average return on D10 is positive, 
portfolio B20 produces a negative average excess returns which is economically significant if 
not statistically significant.  The funds in these portfolios are essentially the very smallest funds 
in the fund universe, and they seem to perform as badly as the very largest funds captured in 
portfolio T20.  Perhaps at both extremes the funds suffer from a lack of fund manager attention?  
The small funds, because they are just not significant from a fee generation perspective, and 
the larger funds perhaps because the manager does not want to rock the fee-generating boat? 
 
Figure 7 shows a fairly smooth appreciation in post-ranking performance as we move from 
portfolio T20 to B20 when we rank funds according to annual net inflows.  We find this 
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improvement in performance as net flows decline to be significant at the 99% level of 
confidence.  In Table 9 we present the related performance statistics.  Portfolios D1 to D5 
produce negative annualised returns that are economically significant though not statistically 
so.  The negative average returns produced by portfolio T20 is particularly large at 1.18%.   
These results suggest that strong net inflows tend to lead to below benchmark performance in 
subsequent months.  Portfolios D6 to D9 all produce positive average returns, though these are 
arguably only economically significant for D6 – a portfolio that comprises those funds that 
receive neither extremely high or low levels of net inflow.  However, once again the alphas of 
these funds are found to be insignificantly different from zero.  Portfolio D10 produces a very 
small average, negative return, but portfolio B20 produces a positive excess return of 0.64%pa 
which is economically significant.  We find the performance difference between portfolios T20 
and B20 to be significant at just under the 95% confidence interval.  It seems plausible then 
that net inflows could be distracting managers from their investment strategies and, indeed, 
making it difficult for them to implement those strategies.  Our results are also consistent with 
those of Sapp and Tiwari (2004) who, using data from a much earlier period, find that the post 
ranking performance of funds that experience relatively high levels of net inflows do not 
subsequently outperform those with lower net inflows. 
 
An anonymous referee suggested that small cap funds might suffer disproportionately from net 
inflows, as a consequence of the additional constraints involved in investing in small cap 
stocks.  To test this hypothesis we recalculated the fractile performance portfolios using the 
recursive portfolio formation fist, using only small cap funds and then using only large cap 
funds.  We then subtracted the benchmark-adjusted returns of the large cap portfolio from the 
equivalent returns generated by the small cap portfolio.  The results are shown in the last 
column of Table 9.  They show that there is a performance difference between the two sub-stes 
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of funds.  The portfolios comprising the small cap funds tend to underperform their large cap 
equivalents.  For example, the Table shows that the small cap D1 portfolio, underperforms the 
large cap D1 portfolio by 0.03% per month, thus providing tentative evidence in support of the 
hypothesis.  However, we do not find the difference in mean performance of these portfolios 
to be statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. 
 
Figure 8 presents a similar picture to the pattern shown in Figure 7 also displaying a fairly 
smooth improvement in performance as we move from funds that had high turnover to funds 
that had lower turnover.  We again find that this performance progression is statistically 
significant at the 99% level of confidence.  In Table 10 we present the related performance 
statistics.  The results indicate that funds with high turnover subsequently tend to produce 
negative benchmark-adjusted returns.  Portfolios D1 to D4 produce annualised returns ranging 
from –0.43% and –0.17%.  The extreme turnover portfolio, T20, produces even larger, and 
economically meaningful annualised underperformance of -1.01%.  By contrast portfolios D7 
to D10 that comprise funds with relatively low levels of portfolio turnover all produce small 
positive annualised returns in excess of their benchmarks of 0.21%, 0.20%, 0.40% and 0.09% 
respectively.  However, intriguingly, portfolio B20 produces negative average returns.  The 
funds that make up these portfolios had the lowest turnover levels.  High turnover would seem 
to be an indicator of future, negative excess returns, but at the same time those funds with very 
low turnover also subsequently tend to produce negative excess returns.  It is fairly 
straightforward to rationalise the relationship between high turnover and negative excess 
returns since turnover increases the costs of running a portfolio, other things being equal, and 
has been associated with wealth damaging behavioural biases such as overtrading linked to 
overconfidence (see Barber and Odean (2000)).  Perhaps the very low levels of turnover 
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represented in portfolio B20 are associated with a paucity of manager investment ideas or, more 
simply, due to manager neglect?    
 
Figure 9 and Table 11 present the performance of portfolios constructed according to the 
average annual holdings in each fund.  No clear patterns really emerges with this portfolio 
ordering technique.  A result that indicates that this criterion is not a useful indicator of future 
excess performance.  The only economically notable, though not statistically notable result in 
Table 11 is found for portfolio B20 where annualised negative excess return is found to be 
1.45%, which might be due to poor portfolio diversification within the 20 funds that make up 
this portfolio each year. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 and Table 12 present the performance of the pre-ordered portfolios using 
annual fund fees as the ranking criteria.  Figure 10 shows a clear outperformance of low fee 
funds compared to funds with higher fees, for example, portfolio D1 produces an average, 
benchmark-adjusted performance of -0.08% per month, while portfolio 10 produces an average 
monthly outperformance of 0.04% per month.  The 0.12% difference between the two is clearly 
very significant in economic terms.  A test for the statistical significance of the difference 
between the two shows that this difference is significant at the 99% level of confidence.  Table 
12 presents the portfolios’ alphas and alpha t-statistics from the one and four factor model.  
Taken together these results indicate that, other things equal, funds with relatively low fees 
should be preferred to those with relatively high fees. 
 
7.  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, using a comprehensive and up-to-date database of US equity mutual funds, we 
have explored the possibility that some indicators may act as predictors of benchmark-adjusted 
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mutual fund performance.  Using indicators based upon mutual fund returns, there does seem 
to be some evidence to suggest that performance persists at the top and bottom end of the 
performance spectrum.  Using average net, benchmark-adjusted returns, and the standard 
deviation of these returns (tracking error) all indicate that performance tends to persist, 
particularly at the bottom end of the performance range.  But the indicators that seem to produce 
the most consistent, returns-based measure of ex ante performance are the t-ratio generated on 
an alpha based upon a one-factor model of these returns and the information ratio.  We find a 
significant deterioration in performance as we move from funds with a high pre-ranking t-
alphas and information ratios to funds with progressively lower pre-ranking t-alphas and 
information ratios.  We also explored other potential indicators of performance.  We find weak 
evidence that both large and small funds subsequently produce poor benchmark-adjusted 
returns.  Perhaps at both extremes the funds suffer from a lack of fund manager attention?  The 
small funds, because they are just not significant from a fee generation perspective, and the 
larger funds perhaps because the manager does not want to rock the fee-generating boat?  
However, overall we find that AUM does not prove to be a very consistent way of identifying 
post-ranking performance.  However, we find that both net flows and fund turnover do produce 
fairly consistent post-ranking returns.  Funds that receive high net inflows in year t, tend to 
produce poor benchmark-adjusted returns in year t+1.  It seems plausible then that in- and out-
flows distract managers from their investment strategies making it difficult for them to 
implement those strategies.  We find similar evidence when we use fund turnover as a pre-
ranking criteria.  Funds that experience high levels of turnover in year t, tend to produce poor 
benchmark-adjusted returns in year t+1.  High turnover has been linked to wealth damaging 
behavioural biases by Barber and Odean (2000).  It appears that there may be some evidence 
for this phenomenon in our results. 
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The results in this paper focus on short-term post-ranking performance – over one year.  They 
suggest, in particular, that investors should avoid investing in, or should disinvest from 
managers that produce a low information ratio, have high turnover, where the fund experiences 
high net inflows and where the fund fees are high.  We hope that this information will be useful 
to professional financial advisors and fund selectors who generally have access to data sources 
that will help them identify the funds that comprise, for example, the top ten percent of funds 
by fund fee.  However, retail investors might not have access to this sort of information.  For 
them to make use of the results in the paper fund providers would need to include such 
information in the Key Investor Information Document (KIID)7.  So for example, as well as 
providing information about the fund’s past performance, regulators should perhaps compel 
fund management companies to provide percentile-based information about the fund’s fees, 
turnover etc, based upon a comparable cohort. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 The Key Investor Information Document (KIID) is a document that provides key information about investment 
funds, in order to help a potential investor compare different investment funds and assess which fund meets their 
specific needs. 
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Figure 1 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the average 
benchmark-adjusted return.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
tracking error.   
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Figure 3 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
information ratio. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
worst monthly performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Figure 5 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the t-ratio 
on each fund’s alpha, generated by a one factor model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
AUM. 
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Figure 7 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
annual net inflows. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
annual turnover. 
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Figure 9 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
annual holdings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
This Figure presents the annualised, net-of-fee, benchmark-adjusted performance of portfolios of US domiciled 
mutual funds.  The statistics are based upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were 
formed using the recursive portfolio technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s 
annual fees. 
 
 
 
  
43 
 
Table 1: Excess Return Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the returns generated by a sample of US domiciled mutual funds, 
grouped according each fund’s primary benchmark.  The statistics are based upon returns in excess of a proxy for 
the risk free rate and are presented both gross and net of fees. Ave is the average monthly excess return; Stdev is 
the standard deviation of monthly excess returns; alpha is the one-factor alpha where the market was proxied by 
the excess return on S&P500; % sig + represents the proportion of alphas that were found to be positive significant 
at at least the 95% significance level; and % sig - represents the proportion of alphas that were found to be negative 
significant at at least the 95% significance level. 
 
  
No. of 
funds Ave Stdev alpha % sig + % sig - 
Full sample Gross 2159 0.48% 0.50% 0.27% 23.3% 0.6% 
 
Net 2159 0.38% 0.52% 0.17% 13.4% 1.2% 
Russell 1000 Gross 45 0.43% 0.39% 0.20% 13.3% 0.0% 
 Net 45 0.35% 0.40% 0.12% 6.7% 0.0% 
Russell 1000 Growth Gross 242 0.30% 0.50% 0.09% 6.6% 0.8% 
 Net 242 0.20% 0.49% 0.00% 2.1% 2.9% 
Russell 1000 Value Gross 215 0.48% 0.40% 0.26% 26.5% 0.0% 
 Net 215 0.40% 0.40% 0.18% 10.7% 0.0% 
Russell 2000 Gross 175 0.75% 0.43% 0.49% 39.4% 0.6% 
 Net 175 0.63% 0.49% 0.37% 28.6% 1.1% 
Russell 2000 Growth Gross 144 0.54% 0.54% 0.31% 12.5% 0.0% 
 Net 144 0.43% 0.54% 0.20% 4.2% 0.0% 
Russell 2000 Value Gross 111 0.81% 0.41% 0.54% 51.4% 0.0% 
 Net 111 0.71% 0.41% 0.44% 41.4% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Gross 36 0.75% 0.30% 0.41% 33.3% 0.0% 
 Net 36 0.64% 0.30% 0.31% 16.7% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Growth Gross 35 0.62% 0.51% 0.41% 31.4% 0.0% 
 Net 35 0.51% 0.50% 0.31% 20.0% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Value Gross 17 0.82% 0.39% 0.42% 47.1% 0.0% 
 Net 17 0.72% 0.39% 0.33% 11.8% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Gross 55 0.53% 0.38% 0.27% 25.5% 0.0% 
 Net 55 0.45% 0.39% 0.18% 10.9% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Growth Gross 41 0.33% 0.55% 0.19% 2.4% 0.0% 
 Net 41 0.23% 0.58% 0.09% 2.4% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Value Gross 35 0.75% 0.26% 0.39% 31.4% 0.0% 
 Net 35 0.66% 0.26% 0.30% 22.9% 0.0% 
Russell Mid Cap Gross 49 0.70% 0.37% 0.40% 44.9% 0.0% 
 Net 49 0.60% 0.37% 0.30% 30.6% 0.0% 
Russell Mid Cap Growth Gross 118 0.47% 0.44% 0.27% 14.4% 0.0% 
 Net 118 0.37% 0.43% 0.17% 5.9% 0.0% 
Russell Mid Cap Value Gross 72 0.82% 0.30% 0.48% 55.6% 0.0% 
 Net 72 0.72% 0.30% 0.39% 40.3% 0.0% 
S&P 500   Gross 653 0.34% 0.52% 0.18% 17.9% 1.2% 
 Net 653 0.23% 0.55% 0.07% 8.9% 2.5% 
S&P Mid Cap 400  Gross 37 0.53% 0.45% 0.38% 32.4% 0.0% 
 Net 37 0.42% 0.49% 0.27% 21.6% 0.0% 
 
44 
 
Table 2: Benchmark-Adjusted Return Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the returns generated by a sample of US domiciled mutual funds, 
grouped according to each fund’s primary benchmark.  The statistics are based upon returns in excess of each 
fund’s primary benchmark and are presented both gross and net of fees. Ave is the average monthly excess return; 
Stdev is the standard deviation of monthly excess returns; alpha is the one-factor alpha where the market was 
proxied by the excess return on S&P500; % sig + represents the proportion of alphas that were found to be positive 
significant at at least the 95% significance level; and % sig - represents the proportion of alphas that were found 
to be negative significant at at least the 95% significance level. 
 
  
No. of 
funds Ave Stdev alpha % sig + % sig - 
Full sample Gross 2133 0.12% 0.28% 0.19% 17.6% 0.7% 
 
Net 2133 0.03% 0.30% 0.09% 7.5% 1.8% 
Russell 1000 Gross 45 0.11% 0.17% 0.18% 11.1% 0.0% 
 Net 45 0.03% 0.17% 0.10% 6.7% 0.0% 
Russell 1000 Growth Gross 242 0.13% 0.18% 0.19% 10.3% 0.0% 
 Net 242 0.05% 0.18% 0.10% 3.3% 0.8% 
Russell 1000 Value Gross 215 0.07% 0.24% 0.13% 11.6% 0.5% 
 Net 215 -0.01% 0.24% 0.05% 4.2% 3.3% 
Russell 2000 Gross 175 0.20% 0.27% 0.30% 30.3% 0.6% 
 Net 175 0.08% 0.35% 0.18% 10.3% 1.7% 
Russell 2000 Growth Gross 85 0.15% 0.32% 0.23% 31.8% 0.0% 
 Net 85 0.04% 0.34% 0.12% 9.4% 1.2% 
Russell 2000 Value Gross 111 0.15% 0.23% 0.22% 21.6% 0.0% 
 Net 111 0.05% 0.23% 0.12% 7.2% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Gross 36 0.06% 0.22% 0.17% 22.2% 0.0% 
 Net 36 -0.04% 0.22% 0.07% 11.1% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Growth Gross 35 0.18% 0.27% 0.26% 25.7% 0.0% 
 Net 35 0.08% 0.27% 0.16% 14.3% 0.0% 
Russell 2500 Value Gross 44 0.28% 0.25% 0.30% 13.6% 0.0% 
 Net 44 0.17% 0.27% 0.19% 2.3% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Gross 6 0.18% 0.18% 0.20% 16.7% 0.0% 
 Net 6 0.09% 0.16% 0.12% 16.7% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Growth Gross 20 0.26% 0.23% 0.28% 30.0% 0.0% 
 Net 20 0.17% 0.23% 0.19% 10.0% 0.0% 
Russell 3000 Value Gross 26 0.23% 0.24% 0.35% 38.5% 0.0% 
 Net 26 0.11% 0.23% 0.22% 23.1% 0.0% 
Russell Mid Cap Gross 12 -0.03% 0.39% 0.00% 0.0% 8.3% 
 Net 12 -0.13% 0.40% -0.09% 0.0% 8.3% 
Russell Mid Cap Growth Gross 59 0.07% 0.21% 0.14% 8.5% 0.0% 
 Net 59 -0.02% 0.21% 0.04% 5.1% 0.0% 
Russell Mid Cap Value Gross 13 0.06% 0.11% 0.18% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Net 13 -0.04% 0.12% 0.09% 0.0% 0.0% 
S&P 500   Gross 653 0.12% 0.34% 0.18% 17.9% 1.2% 
 Net 653 0.02% 0.37% 0.08% 8.9% 2.3% 
S&P MidCap 400  Gross 37 -0.20% 0.35% -0.15% 5.4% 0.0% 
 Net 37 -0.31% 0.39% -0.26% 2.7% 5.4% 
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Table 3: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Benchmark-adjusted Returns 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the average benchmark-adjusted return.  Mean 
represents the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha 
where the market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of 
the one factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and 
alpha4 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest 
and lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 0.37% 0.32% 0.13 0.65% 0.26 
D1 0.43% 0.37% 0.17 0.93% 0.41 
D2 -0.09% -0.13% -0.06 0.56% 0.25 
D3 0.10% 0.08% 0.04 0.75% 0.34 
D4 0.10% 0.07% 0.03 0.80% 0.37 
D5 -0.21% -0.19% -0.09 0.56% 0.26 
D6 0.08% 0.10% 0.05 0.85% 0.40 
D7 0.07% 0.09% 0.04 0.90% 0.42 
D8 -0.19% -0.15% -0.07 0.66% 0.31 
D9 -0.17% -0.15% -0.07 0.74% 0.35 
D10 -1.12% -1.09% -0.51 -0.04% -0.02 
B20 -4.14% -4.08% -1.57 -2.82% -1.08 
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Table 4: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Tracking Error 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s tracking error.  Mean represents the 
average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the market 
was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one factor; 
alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 t is 
the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest and lowest 
20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 -6.88% -6.73% -2.32 -5.29% -2.26 
D1 -1.07% -1.03% -0.47 -0.02% -0.01 
D2 -0.29% -0.27% -0.13 0.49% 0.23 
D3 0.01% 0.01% 0.00 0.76% 0.35 
D4 0.34% 0.31% 0.15 1.10% 0.50 
D5 0.15% 0.13% 0.06 0.92% 0.42 
D6 0.18% 0.17% 0.08 0.92% 0.43 
D7 0.08% 0.08% 0.04 0.82% 0.38 
D8 -0.09% -0.10% -0.05 0.62% 0.29 
D9 -0.07% -0.06% -0.03 0.64% 0.30 
D10 -0.20% -0.21% -0.10 0.49% 0.24 
B20 -0.39% -0.40% -0.20 0.30% 0.14 
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Table 5: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Information ratio 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s information ratio.  Mean represents 
the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the 
market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one 
factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 
t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest and 
lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 0.59% 0.48% 0.22 1.06% 0.48 
D1 0.41% 0.33% 0.15 0.95% 0.44 
D2 0.08% 0.01% 0.01 0.70% 0.32 
D3 0.45% 0.42% 0.20 1.10% 0.51 
D4 0.13% 0.11% 0.05 0.85% 0.40 
D5 0.14% 0.14% 0.07 0.88% 0.41 
D6 0.10% 0.14% 0.06 0.86% 0.41 
D7 0.12% 0.14% 0.07 0.89% 0.42 
D8 -0.24% -0.23% -0.11 0.57% 0.27 
D9 -0.73% -0.70% -0.33 0.20% 0.09 
D10 -1.44% -1.33% -0.60 -0.31% -0.14 
B20 -2.56% -2.36% -0.97 -1.23% -0.50 
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Table 6: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Worst within-month return 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s worst with-in month return.  Mean 
represents the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha 
where the market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of 
the one factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and 
alpha4 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest 
and lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 0.07% 0.04% 0.02 0.68% 0.31 
D1 -0.09% -0.11% -0.05 0.54% 0.25 
D2 -0.06% -0.08% -0.04 0.62% 0.29 
D3 -0.08% -0.08% -0.04 0.62% 0.29 
D4 -0.03% -0.03% -0.01 0.72% 0.34 
D5 -0.02% -0.03% -0.02 0.72% 0.34 
D6 -0.14% -0.13% -0.06 0.62% 0.29 
D7 0.15% 0.15% 0.07 0.91% 0.43 
D8 0.01% 0.01% 0.01 0.82% 0.39 
D9 0.20% 0.23% 0.11 1.03% 0.48 
D10 -0.95% -0.93% -0.43 0.10% 0.04 
B20 -4.97% -4.94% -1.95 -4.91% -1.98 
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Table 7: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – t-alpha 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the t statistic on each fund’s alpha.  Mean 
represents the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha 
where the market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of 
the one factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and 
alpha4 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest 
and lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 0.39% 0.28% 0.15 0.47% 0.24 
D1 0.36% 0.31% 0.15 0.89% 0.43 
D2 0.30% 0.26% 0.12 0.97% 0.45 
D3 0.06% 0.04% 0.02 0.77% 0.36 
D4 -0.11% -0.13% -0.07 0.58% 0.27 
D5 -0.03% -0.03% -0.02 0.72% 0.34 
D6 -0.12% -0.13% -0.07 0.64% 0.30 
D7 -0.14% -0.15% -0.08 0.64% 0.30 
D8 -0.08% -0.04% -0.04 0.77% 0.36 
D9 -0.42% -0.39% -0.21 0.42% 0.20 
D10 -1.12% -1.10% -0.61 -0.41% -0.22 
B20 -1.95% -1.96% -1.21 -1.55% -0.93 
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Table 8: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – AUM  
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s AUM.  Mean represents the average, 
annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the market was 
proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one factor; alpha4 
is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 t is the t-value 
generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest and lowest 20 ranked 
mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 -0.24% -0.25% -0.1414 0.38% 0.21 
D1 -0.04% -0.05% -0.0330 0.63% 0.34 
D2 -0.48% -0.49% -0.2766 0.18% 0.10 
D3 -0.14% -0.15% -0.0897 0.50% 0.26 
D4 0.00% -0.01% -0.0129 0.62% 0.33 
D5 -0.03% -0.03% -0.0238 0.63% 0.33 
D6 -0.11% -0.11% -0.0684 0.56% 0.30 
D7 0.08% 0.08% 0.0363 0.72% 0.38 
D8 0.09% 0.10% 0.0466 0.75% 0.41 
D9 -0.01% 0.00% -0.0094 0.62% 0.35 
D10 0.10% 0.11% 0.0526 0.73% 0.41 
B20 -0.23% -0.23% -0.1341 0.34% 0.18 
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Table 9: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Annual Net Flows 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the net flows into each fund.  Mean represents 
the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the 
market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one 
factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 
t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  The column headed Mean Diff presents the 
difference between the average return generated by Small Cap funds and by Large Cap funds.  Portfolios T20 and 
B20 comprise highest and lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
 Mean 
Diff 
T20 -1.18% -1.15% -0.53 -0.37% -0.17 -0.07% 
D1 -0.48% -0.46% -0.22 0.36% 0.17 -0.03% 
D2 -0.50% -0.48% -0.23 0.32% 0.15 -0.01% 
D3 -0.30% -0.30% -0.14 0.48% 0.23 0.08% 
D4 -0.25% -0.23% -0.12 0.55% 0.27 -0.03% 
D5 -0.09% -0.09% -0.05 0.61% 0.31 -0.02% 
D6 0.48% 0.48% 0.24 1.23% 0.60 0.02% 
D7 0.13% 0.13% 0.06 0.81% 0.40 0.01% 
D8 0.16% 0.14% 0.07 0.87% 0.42 0.05% 
D9 0.10% 0.09% 0.05 0.86% 0.41 0.00% 
D10 -0.09% -0.11% -0.06 0.60% 0.30 -0.03% 
B20 0.64% 0.61% 0.29 1.28% 0.59 0.01% 
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Table 10: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Annual Turnover 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the turnover of each fund.  Mean represents the 
average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the market 
was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one factor; 
alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 t is 
the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest and lowest 
20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 -1.01% -1.04% -0.53 -0.35% -0.18 
D1 -0.43% -0.45% -0.22 0.32% 0.16 
D2 -0.40% -0.43% -0.21 0.31% 0.15 
D3 -0.24% -0.23% -0.12 0.48% 0.24 
D4 -0.17% -0.16% -0.08 0.55% 0.27 
D5 0.05% 0.09% 0.04 0.85% 0.42 
D6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.72% 0.35 
D7 0.21% 0.23% 0.11 0.93% 0.45 
D8 0.20% 0.21% 0.10 0.92% 0.45 
D9 0.40% 0.38% 0.18 1.13% 0.54 
D10 0.09% 0.08% 0.04 0.88% 0.41 
B20 -0.05% -0.08% -0.04 0.73% 0.33 
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Table 11: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Average annual fund holdings 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was the number of holdings in each fund.  Mean 
represents the average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha 
where the market was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of 
the one factor; alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and 
alpha4 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest 
and lowest 20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 -0.36% -0.35% -0.26 0.02% 0.02 
D1 -0.04% -0.03% -0.02 0.50% 0.30 
D2 -0.14% -0.13% -0.08 0.44% 0.26 
D3 0.01% 0.02% 0.01 0.56% 0.32 
D4 0.09% 0.09% 0.05 0.67% 0.39 
D5 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01 0.56% 0.33 
D6 0.10% 0.11% 0.07 0.66% 0.39 
D7 -0.14% -0.15% -0.09 0.44% 0.26 
D8 -0.12% -0.10% -0.06 0.41% 0.25 
D9 -0.16% -0.15% -0.09 0.46% 0.26 
D10 -0.06% -0.06% -0.04 0.52% 0.30 
B20 -1.45% -1.47% -0.96 -1.06% -0.68 
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Table 12: Recursive portfolio performance statistics – Fund fees 
This table presents the performance statistics of portfolios of US domiciled mutual funds.  The statistics are based 
upon equally-weighted, benchmark-adjusted returns.  The portfolios were formed using the recursive portfolio 
technique described in the text, where the ranking indicator was each fund’s annual fees.  Mean represents the 
average, annualised, benchmark-adjusted return of each portfolio; alpha1 is the one-factor alpha where the market 
was proxied by the excess return on S&P500; alpha1 t is the t-value generated on the alpha of the one factor; 
alpha4 is the four-factor alpha where the factors were taken from the Kenneth French website; and alpha4 t is 
the t-value generated on the alpha of the four factor model.  Portfolios T20 and B20 comprise highest and lowest 
20 ranked mutual funds respectively.  Portfolios were reordered annually. 
 
  Mean alpha1 alpha1 t alpha4 alpha4 t 
T20 -0.45% -0.40% -2.43 -0.41% -0.004 
D1 -0.08% 0.01% 0.03 -0.01% 0.000 
D2 -0.04% 0.05% 0.32 0.04% 0.000 
D3 0.00% 0.10% 0.66 0.08% 0.001 
D4 -0.01% 0.09% 0.53 0.07% 0.001 
D5 -0.02% 0.07% 0.45 0.06% 0.001 
D6 -0.02% 0.08% 0.51 0.05% 0.001 
D7 0.01% 0.11% 0.67 0.09% 0.001 
D8 -0.01% 0.08% 0.51 0.07% 0.001 
D9 0.02% 0.11% 0.68 0.09% 0.001 
D10 0.04% 0.13% 0.80 0.11% 0.001 
B20 0.03% 0.11% 0.70 0.09% 0.001 
 
 
